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WAR CRIMES
THE NUREMBERG PRINCIPLES AND
THE GULF WAR
BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ*
I. INTRODUCTION
On December 11, 1946, the first General Assembly of the
United Nations passed three successive resolutions designed to
prevent a recurrence of some of the atrocious crimes that had been
committed during World War II. These resolutions demonstrated
the international community's respect for what have become
known as the Nuremberg principles. The first resolution, 94 (I),'
designated a U.N. committee to study the progressive development
and codification of international law. The second resolution, 95
(I),2 unanimously affirmed "the principles of international law rec-
ognized by the Charter of the Nfirnberg Tribunal and the judg-
ment of the Tribunal."3 The third resolution, 96 (I),' condemned
* Former Prosecutor, Nuremberg War Crimes Trials. Adjunct Professor of Interna-
tional Law, Pace Law School.
1 G.A. Res. 94 (I), U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., Resolutions, at 188, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add. 1
(1946), reprinted in 2 BENJAMIN B. FERENcZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT-A STEP
TOWARD WORLD PEACE 127 (1980) [hereinafter FERENCZ, INT'L CRIMINAL CouRT]. In 94 (I),
the General Assembly referred to its obligations, under the U.N. Charter article 13(1)a, to
encourage the "progressive development of international law and its codification." Id.
I G.A. Res. 95 (I), U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., Resolutions, at 188, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add. 1
(1946), reprinted in 2 FERENCZ, INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 1, at 127. In 95 (I), refer-
ence was made to the trial of major war criminals before the International Military Tribunal
created pursuant to a Charter drawn up by the four major victorious powers in London in
August 1945 and to a similar Charter for the trial of war criminals in the Far East in Janu-
ary 1946. Id.
3 Id.
4 G.A. Res. 96 (I), U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., Resolutions, at 188, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add. 1
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
genocide as an international crime, "for the commission of which
principals and accomplices-whether private individuals, public
officials or statesmen... are punishable." 5 What has happened to
those resolutions during the intervening years, and what relevance
do they have for the Gulf War of 1991?
By way of background and refresher, let us briefly review the
Nuremberg principles to see what action has been taken in the
United Nations-or elsewhere-to develop and codify interna-
tional criminal law, and what impact these principles have had on
the behavior of states and national leaders. The war in the Gulf
can then be appraised in light of the historical legal record to see
what lessons may be learned if we are to have a more peaceful
world order.
II. THE NUREMBERG PRINCIPLES REVIEWED
The origins of the Charter for the International Military Tri-
bunal ("IMT") and the basis for its codification of emerging norms
of international criminal law have been set forth in meticulous de-
tail elsewhere and need not be repeated here." It is important to
understand that neither the IMT Charter nor the Tribunal was
something newly created out of whole cloth by a vengeful world.
Quite the contrary; the widespread desire simply to execute Nazi
leaders had to be suppressed-primarily by the United States-in
order to give those accused a fair trial under law.7 The Charter
articulated norms that had been emerging over a long period of
time and that were supported by a substantial body of treaties,
pacts, conventions, declarations, and international understandings
outlawing the actions therein condemned.8
The Charter, which was adhered to by nineteen other nations,
listed three broad categories of crimes that were subject to crimi-
nal punishment." It also laid down certain principles that were to
bind the court ° and established procedures to govern the trial."
(1946), reprinted in 2 FERENCZ, INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 1, at 127-28.
Id. at 128.
o See, e.g., 1-2 FERENCZ, INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 1.
7 1 FERENCZ, INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 1, at 66-68.
8 See id. at 1-65 (examining development of war norms prior to IMT Charter).
CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL art. 6, reprinted in 1 FERENCZ,
INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 1, at 457-58.
10 Id. arts. 7-13.
11 Id. arts. 14-30.
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Crimes subject to the Tribunal's jurisdiction were:
1. Crimes Against Peace: planning, preparation, initiation, or
waging of a war of aggression;
2. War Crimes: violations of the laws or customs of war; and
3. Crimes Against Humanity: murder, extermination, enslave-
ment, deportation committed against any civilian population, as
well as certain persecutions on racial, political, or religious
grounds.12
The Crime Against Peace, commonly referred to as aggression
or aggressive war, articulated the evolving legal norms which found
earlier expression in such widely accepted treaties as the 1928 Kel-
logg-Briand Pact for the General Renunciation of War."3 Declaring
a war crime to be a criminal offense was nothing new: the Hague
Conventions and many agreements and codes for the conduct of
war had made the commission of atrocities a punishable military
crime."'
What distinguished a Crime Against Humanity from an ordi-
nary felony or war crime was its magnitude: the offensiveness of
the Crime Against Humanity was so great that it shocked the con-
science of, and thereby constituted a crime against, all humanity,
rather than merely against the citizens of an offended state. What
was new, however, was that the law, following the needs of a
changing world, had reached a point where national leaders would
be held accountable for such massive violations of human
rights-even if committed against their own citizens."
In addition to listing three categories of crimes, the Charter
laid down certain principles to govern the court: (1) leaders, or-
ganizers, instigators, and accomplices of a common plan or conspir-
acy to commit any of the three categories of crimes would be held
22 Id. art. 6.
" Central Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug.
27, 1928, 93-94 L.N.T.S. 57. The Kellogg-Briand Pact, dedicated to the resolution of conflict
by peaceful means, was ratified by more than 50 nations, including the United States, Ger-
many, France, Great Britain, and Japan.
14 See, e.g., DocUMENTs ON THE LAWS OF WAR 10-12 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelif
eds., 1982) ("notion that individuals bear direct responsibility for violations of laws of war is
one which arose with the development of the law"); 1-2 HOWARD S. LEvIE, THE CODE OF
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT (1986) (compiling law of international armed conflict in
form of code).
15 See generally MYREs S. McDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELCIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1961) (changing and evolving nature of international law); W.
Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84
AMi. J. INT'L L. 866, 866-76 (1990).
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criminally responsible; (2) the official position of a defend-
ant-even if a head of state-would not free him of responsibility
or mitigate punishment; (3) acting under superior orders could be
considered in mitigation only if, in the opinion of the court, justice
so required; and (4) in the interests of justice, the Tribunal was
authorized to try a person in absentia."6
After reviewing its jurisdictional basis, legal principles, and
procedures, the Tribunal concluded that the Charter was not an
arbitrary exercise of power but rather the expression of interna-
tional law existing at that time, thus merely codifying prevailing
norms. Recognizing aggression as the supreme international crime,
and one which high-ranking accused must have known was wrong,
the Tribunal determined that it would be unjust to allow them to
escape liability just because no one had previously been convicted
of that offense. The Charter's provisions condemning atrocities and
other war crimes and reaffirming that superior orders would not
free an individual from responsibility were found to conform with
the prevailing law of all civilized nations. 1
To be sure, nothing quite like the IMT had ever existed, but it
was the logical and promised culmination of previous war crimes
proceedings and unsuccessful attempts to try the Kaiser and Ger-
man war criminals after World War I. Justice Robert H. Jackson,
on leave from the Supreme Court of the United States, was the
principal architect of the Charter and served as Chief Prosecutor
for the United States. In his opening statement, Justice Jackson
gave assurances that the fundamental purpose of the trial was to
advance the cause of law and justice-"one of the most significant
tributes that Power has ever paid to Reason .... The record on
which we judge these defendants today," he said, "is the record on
which history will judge us tomorrow."' 8
"' CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL arts. 6-8, 12, reprinted in 1 FER-
ENCZ, INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 1, at 457-58; see also Benjamin B. Ferencz, Crimes
Against Humanity, in 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 107-09 (1985) (distin-
guishing crimes against humanity from war crimes and felonies and discussing current
problems in implementation of sanctions).
17 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal (Nov.
1945-Oct. 1946) [hereinafter IMT Judgment], extracts reprinted in 1 FERENCZ, INT'L CRIMI-
NAL COURT, supra note 1, at 469-86; see also NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION, OPINION AND
JUDGMENT (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1947).
18 ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE CASE AGAINST THE NAZI WAR CRIMINALS 3, 7 (1946); see also
Whitney R. Harris, Justice Jackson at Nuremberg, 20 INT'L LAW. 867, 867-96 (1986) (re-
viewing contributions by Justice Jackson and associates at Nuremberg to international law
of crime).
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Surely, it would have been preferable to have a tribunal com-
posed solely of representatives of neutral nations, but World War
II was so widespread that no nation was truly neutral. The fairness
of the proceedings was assured by opening the courtroom to the
public, by relying extensively on documentary evidence from cap-
tured German archives, and by guaranteeing every accused an ab-
solutely fair trial. 9 The principles and procedures developed at
Nuremberg were reaffirmed and usually hailed as a great landmark
in the evolution of international criminal law at other war crimes
trials, notably the IMT trial at Tokyo in 1946 and the subsequent
proceedings at Nuremberg and elsewhere.20
A principle of law-perhaps the most important-illustrated
by the Nuremberg trials, although not listed among the standard
Nuremberg principles, is that those in power should punish only
those who have been found guilty of crimes beyond a reasonable
doubt after a fair trial in which the accused were presumed inno-
cent. It is a principle well worth remembering when nations go to
war and seek to establish peace.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT AND CODIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The idea that law should be clarified or codified did not begin
at Nuremberg. It goes back to ancient times. One need only recall
such well known decrees as the Code of Menes, three thousand
years before the birth of Christ, the codes of Hammurabi, Draco,
Solon, Moses, Justinian, and similar sages who have gained renown
as law-givers. The concept of international law as we know it to-
day, however, is fairly new. Indeed, Jeremy Bentham has been
credited with being the first to use the expression "international
law" just over 200 years ago.2
The fear and suffering generated by war have inspired the for-
mulation of international norms intended to control violent inter-
national behavior, as illustrated by the Hague Conventions of 1899
10 See Benjamin B. Ferencz, Nuremberg Trial Procedure and the Rights of the Ac-
cused, 34 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 144, 144-52 (1948).
20 THE NUREMBERG TRIAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (George Ginsburgs & V.N.
Kudriavtsev eds., 1990); TELFORD TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON
THE NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No.10 (U.S. Gov't
Printing Office 1949); NORMAN E. TuToRow, WAR CRIMES, WAR CRIMINALS AND WAR CRIMES
TRIALS, ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY AND SOURCE BOOK (1986).
21 C. John Colombos, Introduction to JEREMY BENTHAM, PLAN FOR AN UNIVERSAL AND
PERPETUAL PEACE 3 (Peace Book Co. 1939).
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and 1907. Following the tragedy of World War I, which cost the
lives of at least twenty million people, the international commu-
nity was shocked into renewed efforts to curb violence between na-
tions. The 1919 Covenant of the League of Nations-like the later
Charter of the United Nations-created an international organiza-
tion designed to maintain the peace by "obligations not to resort to
war," by "the firm establishment of the understandings of interna-
tional law," and "by the maintenance of justice. '22
The League appointed a Committee of Experts for the Pro-
gressive Codification of International Law, the forerunner of the
present International Law Commission ("ILC"). The Committee's
effectiveness, however, was severely limited by the diversity of the
various states' interests and by the unwillingness of states to ac-
cept restraints on their perceived sovereign rights or interests.
Moreover, many states were not ready to accept the binding juris-
diction of any international court-least of all in criminal matters
that might jeopardize their own leaders. Nonetheless, during the
many intervening years, some progress has been made in many
noncontentious areas of common concern, such as in defining con-
sular and diplomatic relations and in the law of treaties. 23
It would not be unfair to conclude that the ILC works at a
pace which would make a snail with a crutch look like a speed de-
mon. This melancholy conclusion reflects the political reality that
nations simply are not ready to agree upon fixed codes or rules of
conduct that may inhibit their behavior in matters which they re-
gard as affecting their honor or vital interests. Many nations would
rather go to war than accept outside decision. Professor Georg
Schwarzenberger of London, noting the failure of nations to re-
spect and advance the law of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, said
that "the Powers involved in the nuclear nexus have resigned
themselves, if necessary, to forsake civilization and accept the con-
22 League of Nations Covenant pmbl., reprinted in 1 BENJAMIN B. FERENcz, DEFINING
INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION-THE SEARCH FOR WORLD PEACE 61 (1975) [hereinafter FER-
ENCZ, AGGRESSION].
23 See LEAGUE OF NATIONS, COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS FOR THE PROGRESSIVE CODIFICATION
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1925-1928) (Shabtai Rosenne ed., 1972) (minutes of Committee's
first four sessions and documents containing principal reports in years 1926-1928); see also
SHABTAI ROSENNE, PRACTICES AND METHODS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 71-82 (1984). The work
of the ILC, including summary records of the meetings, is reported in its annual Yearbook
and in its Reports to the General Assembly. See generally B. G. RAMCHARAN, THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW COMMISSION: ITS APPROACH TO THE CODIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 147-51 (1977); IAN SINCLAIR, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 87-91 (1987).
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sequences of mechanized and depersonalized warfare or, in other
words, mid-twentieth century barbarism in its most destructive
form."'24
Of course, nations are not prepared to admit that they are
barbarians, nor are their lawyers ready to concede their inability to
reach agreements on vital issues of life and death that affect the
peace and security of humankind. In an effort to show progress or
to end the debate, ostensible agreements-which are not agree-
ments at all-are accepted. To reach a consensus, party nations
adopt language so artfully contrived and ambiguous that each na-
tion may plausibly argue for the validity of its own interpretation
and the invalidity of its adversary's. Professor Julius Stone appro-
priately described this reality as "conflict through consensus. 25
The point may be illustrated by noting what nations have
done to define and prohibit some of the international crimes con-
demned at Nuremberg and allegedly committed during the Gulf
War. It took the nations of the world more than fifty years to agree
upon a definition of aggression.26 The definition was adopted by
the U.N. General Assembly on December 14, 1974 without putting
it to a vote. The adopted definition was intended to guide the
Security Council which, all agreed, was the sole judge of whether
aggression had occurred. Despite its adoption by the General As-
sembly, the definition has proved to be ineffective. Even assuming
that the Security Council had been willing to be guided by this
definition, its many loopholes and ambiguous clauses did not really
offer much guidance.2 s
One such ambiguity was the failure to address the distinction
between aggression and self-defense, thereby practically guarantee-
ing that all future wars of aggression would be fought only "in self-
defense." The ineffectiveness was further compounded by the re-
24 2 GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW, As APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 546 (1968).
25 JULIUS STONE, CONFLICT THROUGH CONSENSUS, UNITED NATIONS APPROACHES TO AG-
GRESSION (1977); see also Robert Rosenstock, The Declaration on Principles of Interna-
tional Law Concerning Friendly Relations, 65 AMi. J. INT'L L. 713 (1971) (paragraph-by-
paragraph analysis of language of declaration and considerations underlying choice of
language).
28 See 1-2 FERENCZ, AGGRESSION, supra note 22 (documenting attempts to define
aggression).
27 Benjamin B. Ferencz, The United Nations Consensus Definition of Aggression:
Sieve or Substance, 10 J. INT'L LAW & ECON. 701, 709 (1975).
28 Id. at 711.
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quirement in the consensus definition that "all relevant circum-
stances" (whatever that means) must be taken into account.29 Also,
because only a war of aggression was a crime and because only the
state itself could determine if it was at war, a unilateral declaration
that the state was not engaged in war but rather in a simple "po-
lice action" might exculpate it from criminal liability. In addition,
the consensus definition provided that the use of force in pursuit
of such justified goals as self-determination or freedom from alien
domination could not qualify as a crime of aggression, and that
those "under colonial or racist regimes or other forms of alien
domination" could use any force, or receive any assistance, to ob-
tain their liberation without being subject to criminal liability.30
Thus, despite its symbolic value as an expression of humanity's as-
piration for a more peaceful world, the consensus definition of ag-
gression ironically invited aggression by groups or nations that
could find shelter behind its exculpatory clauses.
Some countries and groups, such as the Palestine Liberation
Organization, are convinced-no doubt sincerely-that their par-
ticular goals3l are so justified that they may employ any means to
achieve them-even violence-and that those who thwart their at-
tainment are the real criminals. It has become a clich6 that "one
man's terrorist is another's freedom fighter." These differences in
perception have not yet been resolved. As a result, the declared
consensus "agreements" on what constitutes the crime of aggres-
sion are more deceptive than real.
Similar ambiguities and lack of specificity can be noted in
other legal instruments that ostensibly outlaw other grave interna-
tional crimes. For instance, the U.N. Conventions prohibiting
crimes against diplomats, terrorism, and hostage-taking 2 all con-
tain almost identical phrases used to justify acts ordinarily consid-
ered to be outrageous criminal deeds.33
21 Id. at 711-12.
30 Id.
31 These goals include self-determination, economic justice, and freedom from alien
occupation.
12 G.A. Res. 34/145, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 244, U.N. Doc. A/34/46
(1979); G.A. Res. 34/146, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 245, U.N. Doc. A/34/46
(1979); G.A. Res. 3166, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
31 1 A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (M. Cherif Bassiouni & Ved P.
Nanda eds., 1973); M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, A DRAFT INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL CODE (1980); 2 FERENCZ, INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 1, at 547-637;
see also United Nations Sixth Committee Draft Resolution on Terrorism, Doc. A/C.6/46/
[Vol. 66:711
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The international community has paid the price for such inde-
cision and deviousness. Little wonder that international crimes
have continued and will continue to plague the world until they are
unequivocally and universally condemned and subjected to effec-
tive international law enforcement. But that will require a signifi-
cantly improved international order-a subject beyond the scope
of this Article. 4
The failure of the international community to develop binding
norms of international criminal law is most glaringly illustrated by
the unsuccessful efforts, thus far, to draft an acceptable Code of
Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind based on the
Nuremberg principles-a mandate issued by the United Nations
over forty-five years ago!35 Nor has there been any significant pro-
gress toward the establishment of an International Criminal Tribu-
nal to punish such offenses. Although special committees of the
United Nations began to work on such a tribunal over forty years
ago, no such court exists anywhere in the world today.38 Recently,
however, perhaps as a consequence of the Gulf war, terrorism, and
drug-trafficking, the ILC and the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the
United Nations have recorded some encouraging progress toward
the enactment of a code of crimes.3 7 The first reading of a draft
code of crimes has been completed. In addition to the crimes enu-
merated at Nuremberg, the Commission, no doubt influenced by
events in the Gulf, added "wilful and severe damage to the
environment." 3
Despite the Nuremberg precedents, it cannot be denied that
international crime has been booming ever since. Nations have
L.4, 1 15 (Oct. 28, 1991).
" See 1-2 BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAw-A WAY TO WORLD
PEACE (1983); BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, WORLD SECURITY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (1991).
35 See Benjamin B. Ferencz, The Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Secur-
ity of Mankind, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 674, 674-79 (1981).
36 See generally 1-2 FERENCZ, INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 1 (collecting docu-
ments concerning efforts to define international aggression and to establish international
criminal court).
7 See U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/46/10 (1991) [hereinafter ILC
Report] (ILC reports, including most recent on work of ILC 45th session ending July 19,
1991); see also John H. McNeill, Book Review, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 227 (1990) (reviewing
BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, PLANETHOOD: THE KEY TO YOUR SURVIVAL AND PROSPERITY (1988))
(encouraging development of broad agreement on establishment of permanent international
criminal court); Stephen C. McCaffrey, The Forty-Second Session of the International Law
Commission, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 930 (1990).
38 See ILC Reports, supra note 37, Doc. A/46/405.
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been accused of aggression in Korea, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Vi-
etnam, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Grenada, Nicaragua,
Cuba, Panama, the Middle East, Africa, the Mediterranean, and
other -parts of the globe. Predictably, it was always the "other side"
that was the lawbreaker attacking the innocent party defending it-
self or its allies. Although millions of innocent people were killed
in such conflicts, consolation was sought in the fact that the nu-
clear super-powers refrained from blowing up the whole world.
The wars which have flourished everywhere since World War
II have been accompanied by grave breaches of the laws of war,
including the illegal use of poison gas. Genocide has been alleged
against Idi Amin of Uganda and Pol Pot of Kampuchea. Other
crimes against humanity, including apartheid, terrorism, the
slaughter of religious and ethnic minorities, drug-trafficking, and
deliberate and massive environmental degradation, have also gone
untried and unpunished-to the shame of the international legal
community!
The existence of a cold war between ideological rivals, who
evaluated these events with different eyes and reached opposite
conclusions (often for domestic or political reasons), coupled with
the reserved right of the superpowers to veto any U.N. action, has
been an important contributing cause to this sorry state of interna-
tional law. Incalculable suffering and human misery have been the
price paid by innocent people everywhere for the refusal of the
world's leaders to honor and expand the principles of Nuremberg.
Failure to respond effectively to aggression and other interna-
tional crimes encourages more aggression and increased criminal-
ity. The inability of the world community to prevent such crimes
in the past helped pave the way to the war in the Gulf and to the
violations of international law that accompanied it.
IV. THE GULF WAR
On August 2, 1990, the armed forces of Iraq launched a mas-
sive, surprise military attack against its peaceful Arab neighbor,
the sovereign state of Kuwait. A statement from the White House
deplored "this blatant use of military aggression" and announced
that the United States-together with Kuwait-was calling an
emergency session of the U.N. Security Council.39 At 4:45 a.m. the
" U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 2, 2932d mtg. at 13, U.N. Doc. A/46/2 (1990)
(statement of United States Ambassador Pickering). President Bush referred to the Iraqi
[Vol. 66:711
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same day, the Security Council convened. The Ambassador of Iraq
explained that his government had been requested to intervene by
a new Free Provisional Government of Kuwait and that Iraqi
forces would be withdrawn as soon as order had been restored,
which he hoped would "take no more than a few days. '40 He de-
nounced the "flagrant intervention" by the United States, which
he took as evidence of collusion between the American government
and the previous government of Kuwait.41
Within seventy-five minutes, the Council unanimously passed
Resolution 660, condemning the invasion and demanding that Iraq
withdraw immediately and unconditionally.42 Four days later,
when Iraq failed to comply, the Council, invoking chapter VII of
the U.N. Charter, unanimously ordered all states to impose strict
economic sanctions against Iraq and not to recognize any puppet
regime.43 A few days later, United States Ambassador Pickering
announced that at the request of Saudi Arabia, the United States
and other nations were sending military forces into the area "to
deter further Iraqi aggression.
44
When a defiant Iraq announced "a comprehensive and eternal
merger with Kuwait," the Security Council responded with Resolu-
tion 662, which declared the annexation null and void.45 When Iraq
refused to allow foreign nationals to leave, thereby holding them
hostage, Resolution 664 demanded their immediate release. 46 Am-
bassador Pickering denounced what he called "this malign conspir-
acy of aggression and prevarication" and declared that Iraq's Pres-
ident Saddam Hussein and his regime would bear full
responsibility for their deeds.47
attack as "naked aggression," Invading Iraqis Seize Kuwait and Its Oil; U.S. Condemns
Attack, Urges United Action, N.Y. TnMEs, Aug. 3, 1990, at Al, and "vicious aggression" by
"international outlaws and renegades." The Iraqi Invasion, N.Y. TirmEs, Aug. 6, 1990, at A7.
41 U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2932d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/2932 (1990).
41 Id.
11 S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2932d mtg. at 1, 27, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2932
(1990). Yemen, not having received instructions, did not vote. Id.
43 U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2933d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2933 (1990). Cuba ab-
stained, charging that the United States had done the same in Panama and had not sought
to impose sanctions against Israel when it occupied Palestinian and Lebanese territory or
against South Africa when it occupied Angola. Id. at 37-48. Yemen abstained, arguing that
the matter should be settled among the Arab states themselves. Id. at 51-52.
44 U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2934th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/2934 (1990).
"' S.C. Res. 662, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 2, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/46/2 (1990).
41 S.C. Res. 664, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 2, at 55, U.N. Doc. A/46/2 (1990).
11 U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2937th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/2937 (1990) (press release, U.S.
Mission to the U.N. statement in Security Council, Aug. 18, 1990).
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Kuwait complained that "Iraqi occupation forces were sav-
agely intensifying their inhumane practices against innocent civil-
ians in Kuwait," killing people in the streets, burning homes, and
committing other atrocities such as murder, rape, plunder, and tor-
ture-all of which were later detailed in submissions, reports, and
videotapes presented to the Council.48 Planned and premeditated
looting, pillaging, and plundering of Kuwait by Iraqi forces took
place on a massive scale, the enormity of which only became ap-
parent later.49 In addition to setting some 700 oil wells on fire, sev-
eral millions of gallons of oil were deliberately flooded into the
Arab gulf in what the Kuwaitis were later to describe as "the most
extensive pollution of the marine environment in history. '50
Despite eleven resolutions tightening the sanctions-an un-
precedented demonstration of unity among the Permanent Mem-
bers-and diplomatic efforts by several states, Iraq remained self-
righteous and defiant. The Council invited states to collect and
submit evidence of grave breaches by Iraq and to prepare claims
for restitution to their injured nationals and corporations.5 1
Sir David Hanny of Great Britain reminded the Council that
under article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Iraqi ac-
tions in Kuwait since August 2, 1990 were grave breaches and in-
ternational crimes that came under the criminal jurisdiction of all
parties to the Conventions.2 France demanded that Iraq comply
with its legal obligations.5 The French representative, Mr. Dumas,
later reminded the Council that the use of chemical and biological
weapons was a breach of the 1925 Geneva Protocol to which Iraq
was a signatory and that all those who violated those laws would
"similarly be held personally responsible. '54 Foreign Minister
Hurd of the United Kingdom also referred to "personal responsi-
bility."55 Mr. Al-Shali of the United Arab Emirates warned of the
tyranny of the individual, stating: "No Arab can feel anything but
shame at the practices and conduct of the Iraqi regime, which has
stabbed in the heart every Arab value, moral principle and
Is U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2959th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/21730 (1990); U.N. SCOR, 46th
Sess., 2960 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/2960 (1990).
' See REPORT OF THE U.N. MISSION, U.N. Doc. S/22535 (1991).
6o U.N. Doc. A/45/1035, S/22787 (1991).
51 S.C. Res. 674, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 2, at 90, U.N. Doc. A/46/2 (1990).
52 U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2962d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/2962 (1990).
53 Id.
"' U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2963d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/2963 (1990).
55 Id.
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concept. '56
Meanwhile, the United States, asserting an inherent right to
come to the defense of threatened allies, continued its military
build-up in Saudi Arabia, where it assembled more than 500,000
troops armed with the latest and most lethal military equipment
ever devised. This army was joined by largely symbolic forces from
other nations.
On November 29, 1990, the Security Council held a historic
meeting,5 and, after extensive debate, passed Resolution 678,
which authorized member states to use "all necessary means to up-
hold and implement [R]esolution 660 and all subsequent relevant
resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the
area" if Iraq failed to comply by January 15, 1991.58 The term "all
necessary means" was nowhere defined, nor was it clear what con-
trols, if any, might be exercised by the Council. The reference to
restoring peace in the area seemed to be a declaratory flourish of
no significance because it was barely mentioned in the debate; its
significance in expanding the area of conflict was to emerge only
later.
What happened thereafter is well known, having been re-
corded on television and reported in great depth everywhere. In
short, hostilities began on January 16, 1991 with thousands of coa-
lition air sorties and missiles striking military targets in Iraq.
86 U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2962d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/2962 (1990).
17 U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2963d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/2963 (1990). It was the United
States' turn to be in the Chair, and Secretary of State James Baker presided. Thirteen other
Council members were represented by their Foreign Ministers, attesting to the significance
of the assemblage. Mr. Baker called upon nations to "meet the threat to international peace
created by Saddam Hussein's aggression." Id. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze of the Soviet
Union warned that
failing to reverse the aggression would mean even greater hardship for the world..
.. Our common future is threatened .... We are serving [the Iraqi leaders] with a
special warning about their personal responsibility for the fate of foreign nationals
in Iraq. Endangering their lives will be regarded as a crime against humanity, with
all the consequences that entails.
Id.
88 S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 2, at 97, U.N. Doc. A/46/2 (1990).
Cuba and Yemen voted against Resolution 678. China abstained, which later gave rise to the
argument that since the Charter, in article 27(3), required "the concurring votes of the per-
manent members," China's failure to cast a concurring vote rendered the resolution invalid.
This objection ignored the fact that the Council had decided in many prior cases that the
Charter was not to be taken literally and that failure to vote was a procedural matter which
the Council was authorized to interpret as not negating the binding nature of a resolution.
See 2 U.N. REPERTORY OF PRACTICE OF U.N. ORGANS art. 27(3), U.N. Sales No. 1955.V.2
(1955).
1992]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
When some captured American flyers were displayed on Iraqi tele-
vision, the State Department reminded Iraq that mistreatment of
prisoners was a war crime, and France warned that "persons guilty
of such breaches will have to answer for them, whatever their level
of responsibility." '
At four o'clock in the morning of February 4, 1991, the United
States Central Command in Saudi Arabia led a coalition of forces
from thirty countries, including the U.K., Kuwait, Egypt, and
Syria, in a massive ground, naval, and air offensive with the de-
clared intention to eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait. They were
joined by air forces from Italy, Canada, the United Arab Emirates,
Bahrain, and Quatar striking key strategic targets. In a display of
military firepower and prowess never before witnessed, Iraqi forces
were pulverized; but not before Iraq managed-to set about 700 oil
wells on fire, divert millions of gallons of oil into the Persian Gulf,
and repeatedly bombard neutral Israel with a shower of explosive
missiles. After 100 hours of ground war, the Iraqi army was in com-
plete rout, fleeing for their lives back to Iraq as "the largest single
American military offensive since World War II" was brought to a
halt.60
Saddam Hussein didn't see things quite that way. He saw the
war as a record of honor in "an epic struggle between right and
wrong ... [,] between the oppressed poor and the unjust and op-
portunistic rich . . . [, and] between injustice, deception and
treachery on the one hand and fairness, justice, honesty and loy-
alty on the other." '61 Vowing to fight on even after the retreat from
Kuwait, he declared: "Victory is sweet with the help of God. '6 2
Saddam's views were, no doubt, shared by his many supporters in
Iraq and other parts of the Arab world, who viewed themselves as
the victims of American, and Israeli, aggression. President Bush
51 See U.N. Doc. S/22130, S/22132 (1991).
'0 Andrew Rosenthal, War in the Gulf: The President; Bush Halts Offensive Combat;
Kuwait Freed, Iraqis Crushed, N.Y. Tiams, Feb. 28, 1991, at Al. The banner headline of
The New York Times on February 28, 1991 read: "BUSH HALTS OFFENSIVE COMBAT;
KUWAIT FREED, IRAQIS CRUSHED." President Bush's address to the nation reported
that it was not merely a victory for Kuwait and the coalition partners, but "a victory for the
United Nations, for all mankind, for the rule of law and for what is right." War in the Gulf:
The White House, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1991, at A12.
81 War in the Gulf: The Iraqi Leader; Saddam Hussein's Speech on the "Withdrawal"
of His Army from Kuwait, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 27, 1991, at A20.
62 Id.
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called Saddam's speech "an outrage. 63
On February 28, 1991, Iraq notified the United Nations that it
would comply with all of the Security Council resolutions, includ-
ing Resolution 660. The United States vowed to stay in Iraq until
Baghdad complied with these resolutions, and held out the possi-
bility of war crimes trials for Iraqi officers who took part in atroci-
ties. A senior administration official suggested that Mr. Bush
would probably not pursue charges against Saddam himself, a fact
that Mr. Bush confirmed at a press conference the next day. This
may not have encouraged Saddam to commit more crimes but it
certainly could not have discouraged him either.
6 4
Terms for a formal cease-fire still had to be agreed upon. Res-
olution 687, passed by the Security Council on April 3, 1991, de-
manded that Iraq recognize the agreed borders with Kuwait, de-
stroy all its chemical and bacteriological weapons as well as all
nuclear weapons materials, and accept on-site inspection. It was
also required to renounce all acts of terrorism.
6 5
Shortly after the Allied rout of Iraqi forces in Kuwait, Kurdish
guerrillas as well as Shiite Muslims in southern Iraq-encouraged
to do so by the United States-rose in revolt against Saddam. Us-
ing the residue of his army, now estimated at some 200,000 men,
and deploying a large force of tanks and gunship helicopters that
the Western allies had failed to destroy, Saddam turned his wrath
against the rebels within his own country. The massacres of Shiites
and Kurds were ruthless. It was reported that about a million
women, children, and old people fled in terror toward Turkey and
Iran, seeking safety from chemical bombs and strafing by vengeful
Iraqi soldiers taking out their frustration and fury on their own
anti-Saddam compatriots.6
American troops were by then on their way home and the
Bush administration hesitated to intervene in what was now de-
scribed in Washington as Iraq's "internal affair." But public outcry
63Andrew Rosenthal, War in the Gulf: The President; Allied Units Surge Through
Kuwait; Troops Confront Elite Force in Iraq; Bush Spurns Hussein's Pullout Move; Sur-
render Demand, N.Y. Ttms, Feb. 27, 1991, at Al.
Andrew Rosenthal, After the War; Truce Holds, but U.S. Vows to Stay in Iraq Until
Baghdad Meets Allies' Peace Terms, N.Y. TiAEs, Mar. 1, 1991, at As; After the War: The
White House; Excerpts from Bush's News Conference on Postwar Plans, N.Y. TiMES, Mar.
2, 1991, § 1, at 5.
"5 S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 2, at 137, U.N. Doc. A/46/2 (1991).
" Alan Cowell, After the War; Kurdish Refugees, by Thousands, Flee Vengeance of
the Iraqi Army, N.Y. Tmixrs, Apr. 4, 1991, at Al.
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against these massive violations of human rights was so great that
Bush, who had compared Saddam to Hitler, was unable to stand
on the sidelines while Iraq murdered its Kurdish and Shiite minor-
ities. " A group of Iraqi intellectuals who had acquired American
citizenship called upon President Bush to use U.S. troops that
were still in occupied southern areas of Iraq to prevent the minori-
ties from being butchered. They also called for the trial of Saddam
Hussein by an international tribunal for crimes against humanity
in Iraq and Kuwait."
At the United Nations, Iraq's repression of the Kurds-as well
as the Sunni and Shiite Moslems-was roundly condemned. The
French representative put it best: "Violations of human rights such
as those now being observed become a matter of international in-
terest when they take on such proportions that they assume the
dimension of a crime against humanity. That is indeed what is
happening in Iraq."69 United States Ambassador Pickering noted
that it was not the intention of the Council to interfere in the in-
ternal affairs of any country; President Bush authorized blankets
and other relief supplies to be air-dropped to the suffering civil-
ians. The Soviet representative, not inclined to argue with the
United States, agreed that interference in internal affairs was im-
permissible but noted that nations should not remain indifferent.
He urged humanitarian assistance. The brutal repression of civil-
ian populations was condemned by many Council members. °
In Security Council Resolution 688, members of the Council
stated that they were "[g]ravely concerned" and "[d]eeply dis-
17 Prominent attorney Floyd Abrams, and Diane Orentlicher, Trustees of the Interna-
tional League for Human Rights, in a letter to The New York Times published on April 14,
1991, decried President Bush's "policy of craven passivity in the face of massive atrocities in
Iraq." They recalled that Nuremberg established that a government's gross violations of its
own citizens rights is far more than an internal affair. We Can Help Kurds Without Send-
ing Troops; Not Internal Affairs, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1991, § 4, at 18 (letter to Editor).
" Clifford Krauss, After the War; Baker Aide Talks with Iraqi Dissidents in U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1991, at A10.
89 U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/2982 (1991).
10 Id. President Bush seems to have had mixed feelings. At a news conference on April
16, 1991, he was asked, "Mrs. Bush suggested that Saddam Hussein be tried for war crimes
and hanged. Do you agree?" The President replied,
I seldom differ with my wife, and I don't know that I would differ with her here..
. [D]o I think he's guilty of war crimes, the environmental terror, the rape and
pillage of Kuwait, what he's done to his own people? I would think there'd be
plenty of grounds under which he would be prosecuted for war crimes.
After the War; Excerpts from Bush's News Conference Today at the White House, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 17, 1991, at A12.
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turbed by the magnitude of the human suffering involved," and
then went on to demand that Iraq stop the oppression and allow
humanitarian organizations to help the victims. 1 United States
Secretary of State Baker, who visited the scene of nearly a million
terrorized refugees fleeing to barren hills for their lives while being
strafed and bombarded with napalm by Iraqi planes, referred to
Iraq's oppression of the Kurds as "a tragic crime," but he added
that it was "up to the international community as a whole to do
something about it."' 72 U.N. experts cited the 1948 Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, pursu-
ant to which member countries undertook to prevent and punish
genocide as a crime under international law.7 3
Despite the many public declarations in support of trials, no
one initiated the necessary measures to bring the responsible par-
ties to account in a court of law. Those who had the power to act
chose not or dared not to turn to the Nuremberg principles and
the enforcement of international law. It was sadly ironic that a
great military victory won by brave young people fighting in dis-
tant lands would be followed by a great human rights disaster and
a lack of legal courage by their political leaders back home to vin-
dicate the violated rights..
It should not have been too surprising when Iraq failed to
comply with U.N. resolutions demanding access to Iraq's chemical,
biological, and nuclear weapons facilities. Security Council com-
plaints of Iraqi deception were met with bland denials. 4 U.N. in-
spection teams uncovered proof of Iraq's duplicity despite Iraqi at-
tempts to conceal the truth. Iraq's perfidy was revealed and
condemned by the Council.7 5 Despite U.N. protests, Saddam Hus-
sein, who evaded punishment for the invasion of Iran and the use
of poison gas against Kurds and Iran in the 1980-1990 war, contin-
ued to thumb his nose at the world body with personal impunity.
71 S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/2982 (1991).
72 Thomas L. Friedman, After the War; Baker Sees and Hears Kurds' Pain in a Brief
Visit at Turkish Border, N.Y. Tms, Apr. 9, 1991, at Al, A12.
7' Alan Riding, After the War; Europeans Urging Enclave for Kurds in Northern Iraq,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1991, at Al.
71 U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2995th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/2995 (1991).
11 S.C. Res. 707, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 2, U.N. Doc. A/46/2 (1991).
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V. AN INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL To DEAL WITH GULF WAR
CRIMES
The powerful nations of the world were well aware of the pos-
sible legal recourse against Saddam Hussein. The Nuremberg pre-
cedent was there for all to see. The Nuremberg principles had been
recognized as binding international criminal law. If a new interna-
tional tribunal was needed to try those who flouted the laws of the
world, there was no real difficulty in creating such a court.76
Many international legal societies have for years been advocat-
ing the creation of an International Criminal Court.77 The Ameri-
can Bar Association as well as several members of the United
States Congress have come out publicly in favor of an international
penal tribunal to deal with terrorists or other international
criminals.78 Many professors of International Law have advocated
the establishment of an international criminal tribunal.79 A collo-
quium of legal experts, convened at New York University Law
76 See 1-2 FERENCZ, INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 1; TOWARD A FEASIBLE INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Julius Stone & Robert K. Woetzel eds., 1970), reviewed by Benja-
min B. Ferencz, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 213 (1972). The Foundation for an International Criminal
Court, headed by the late Professor Robert Woetzel, convened a conference at Talloires,
France in May 1991. Members of the ILC, other U.N. officials, and Prime Minister A.N.R.
Robinson of Trinidad and Tobago, who had been the prime mover in putting the issue back
on the U.N. agenda, attended. It took them only a few days to produce drafts of a code of
crimes and statutes for an interim as well as a permanent international criminal court
(unpublished).
11 Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni of De Paul University, as President of the Interna-
tional Association of Penal Law and the International Institute of Higher Studies in Crimi-
nal Sciences (ISISC) of Siracusa, Italy, has been in the recent forefront of some of these
efforts. The Institute submitted a Draft Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal to
the Eighth U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime, which met in Havana from August 27
to September 7, 1990. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 144/NG0 ISISC. The World Federalist Associa-
tion of Washington D.C. has also been a strong advocate of an International Criminal Court
and published a comprehensive report prepared by Doctor Bryan F. MacPherson at the end
of 1991.
78 See 136 CONG. REc. S16,216 (1990). Senator Arlen Specter, Republican from Penn-
sylvania, sponsored a bill calling for the creation of an international criminal court. Id.; see
also 135 CONG. REc. H527 (1989) (Congressmen Leach of Iowa and Robert W. Kastenmeier
support the creation of an International Criminal Court).
"' Professors Anthony D'Amato of Northwestern University, Ved P. Nanda of the Uni-
versity of Denver, and Christopher Blakesley of Louisiana State University, have also been
among those in the forefront supporting such a tribunal. Professor Blakesley drafted stat-
utes for a regional criminal court. Professor Louis R. Beres of Purdue University has specifi-
cally called upon the United States to take the lead in preparing international legal machin-
ery for the prosecution of Iraqi crimes during the Gulf War. Louis R. Beres, The United
States Should Take the Lead in Preparing International Legal Machinery for Prosecution
of Iraqi Crimes, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 381, 381-89 (1991).
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School on March 27, 1991, also favored a war crimes trial under
U.N. auspices.80
Former Nuremberg prosecutors and other staff members, who
gathered at a reunion in Washington, D.C. on March 23, 1991, con-
cluded with a resolution calling upon the United Nations, the
United States, and its coalition partners to "take all appropriate
action to investigate, indict, prosecute, and punish those Iraqi na-
tionals who have planned and prosecuted an Aggressive War
against Kuwait or committed War Crimes or Crimes Against Hu-
manity.., in violation of the Nuremberg Principles ... "s'
Diplomats, as usual, were much more diplomatic; if they said
anything at all, it was rather vague and indirect. Many made refer-
ence to aggression, but only the German Foreign Minister Hans-
Dietrich Genscher spoke out loud and clear. Referring to the perse-
cution and threatened genocide by Iraq against the Kurdish peo-
ple, he said, "We call for an international court of justice of the
United Nations where crimes against humanity, crimes against
peace, genocide, war crimes and environmental criminality can be
prosecuted and punished."'82 Nuremberg had apparently made a
big impression on the German leader.
But no nation-none-moved to put the item on the U.N.
agenda! Without such action, the United Nations was unable to
move. The subject was left to the plodding of the ILC, where the
creation of a code of international crimes moves forward ever so
slowly and the hopes for an international court to punish the most
atrocious of all international crimes remain a distant dream.
VI. CONCLUSION
Fundamentally, the failure of nations to build on the Nurem-
berg precedents has been due to an absence of will on the part of
decision makers. This is not to suggest that a problem cannot be
found for every solution or that the road to general acceptance and
80 Gulf War and International Criminal Law Conference, co-sponsored by New York
University School of Law, Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights,
The International League of Human Rights, and the American Bar Association-Section of
International Law and Practice (Apr. 30, 1991).
81 137 CONG. REC. S5439 (daily ed. May 7, 1991) (Nuremberg reunion); see also Benja-
min B. Ferencz, The Nuremberg Precedent and the Prosecution of State-Sponsored Mass
Murder, 11 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 325, 325-32 (1991); Will Saddam Survive?, THE
DIPLOMATIC WORLD BuLL., May 6-13, 1991, at 2 (editorial).
82 U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., at 29-30, U.N. Doc. A/46/PV.8 (1991).
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enforcement of the law laid down at Nuremberg will be a quick or
easy one. s3 In the long run, it will depend upon the power of the
people to understand what is required and to persuade those who
now control their destiny to take the necessary action.
As long as the Soviet Union and the United States were en-
gaged in a cold war, there was no hope that any significant pro-
gress could be made. The Soviet Union adamantly refused to ac-
cept the jurisdiction of any international tribunal as a derogation
of its national sovereignty. That changed with the advent of
Mikhail Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika and with this for-
mer Soviet leader's call for a more secure world including binding
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and "a universal
legal order which will ensure the primacy of international law in
politics. '84
A significant manifestation of the change was the ability of the
two former superpower rivals to agree upon action to repel the ag-
gression of Iraq in Kuwait. For the first time, the Security Council
was able to carry out its enforcement obligations as originally in-
tended in the U.N. Charter. Leading statesmen have been calling
for a "New World Order" in which the rule of law and not the law
of the jungle will govern the conduct of nations.8 5 There is thus
basis for renewed hope that constructive change will take place.
One of the essential components of any legal order is a court
to determine the merits of both charges and defenses. A self-ap-
pointed sheriff or posse to mete out instant justice can be very
dangerous. In the absence of an independent, impartial, and fair
tribunal, there is only "wild-west" in place of law and order. Those
who believe in the rule of law and are law-abiding should have
nothing to fear, and those who are guilty should alter their conduct
or be held accountable.
Yet, even after the aggressions, genocide, and atrocities of
World War II, there were those who argued against international
trials. They feared that the court would become a podium for
propaganda and that the allies themselves-or some of
'3 See Michael P. Scharf, The Jury is Still Out on the Need for an International
Criminal Court, 1 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 135 (1991).
84 Mikhail Gorbachev, Reality and Safeguards for a Secure World, PRAVDA, Sept. 17,
1987, translated in U.N. GAOR, 42d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/42/574, S/19143 (1987).
" See Address to the Nation Announcing Allied Military Action in Persian Gulf, 27
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 50 (Jan. 21, 1991) (President George Bush); French President
Mitterand's Address to the U.N. General Assembly, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Doc. A/45/PV.4
(1990).
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them-might be accused of having committed similar crimes. Since
the days of the Magna Carta, sovereigns had been on notice that
they too were obliged to respect the law or face the consequences.
It was the United States that insisted, to its everlasting credit,
upon a trial and the rule of law as the governing principle between
nations.
To be sure, Saddam Hussein and his Governing Council might
argue that Iraq's occupation of Kuwait was justified: the borders
had been fixed by an imperialist power; Kuwait had provoked Iraq
by unfairly rigging oil prices; Arabs were being exploited by Gulf
states concerned only with their own wealth; Iraq was fighting
Israel and Zionism to liberate Palestinians; others go untried for
similar actions; U.S. bombing, which killed 300,000 Iraqis and de-
stroyed their entire infrastructure, exceeded the bounds of propor-
tionality and military necessity and went beyond the limits author-
ized by U.N. resolutions; and so forth.86 Such arguments were
heard at the United Nations before the Security Council decided,
in effect, that the attack on a friendly Arab state was an act of
criminal aggression meriting sanctions by the entire international
community.
Of course, international laws, if they are to have meaning,
must be clear and must be respected universally. It is not enough
merely to pay lip service to the principles and precedents of Nu-
remberg. The ideals therein enshrined must become a living reality
in a peaceful world. Hypocrisy must give way to sincerity. Politics
must yield to principle. Lawlessness must be controlled by law.
Until that happens, innocent people everywhere will continue to
live and die in fear.
Let us recall the concluding statement of Justice Robert Jack-
son to the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg: "If you
were to say of these men that they are not guilty, it would be as
66 Former United States. Attorney General Ramsey Clark drafted an "Initial Com-
plaint" against George Bush and other U.S. leaders, dated May 9, 1991, which was submit-
ted to the Legal Division of the United Nations. At about the same time, Professor Ved
Nanda of the University of Denver College of Law, together with Luis Kutner, Chairman of
the World Habeas Corpus Commission for International Due Process of Law, submitted an
indictment against Saddam Hussein and his advisors. Both drafts relied on the Nuremberg
principles. Because they lacked any official standing, no U.N. action could be based on
them. See U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Doc. A/46fPV.13 (1991) (Iraq charges against United
States). "We call upon the international community through this forum and through the
other regional and international organizations to condemn that criminal act, investigate it
and hold its perpetrators fully responsible." Id. at 38.
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true to say that there has been no war, there are no slain, there has
been no crime. ' '87
87 19 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBU-
NAL 432 (1948).
